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FEATURE
ARTICLE
"AND THE SURVEY SAYS..."

When Is Evidence of Actual
Consumer Confusion Required to
Win a Case Under Section 1692g of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act in the Seventh Circuit?
Michael S. Hilicki'

I. Introduction
Before 1999, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
consistently resolved claims that a collection letter confused consumers about their rights under section 169 2 g
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA" or
"Act")2 by examining the text of the letter alone. In 1999,
the Seventh Circuit deviated from this trend in a series of
cases beginning with Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp. by
holding that the plaintiff could not establish that a collection letter caused confusion about the consumer's rights
unless the plaintiff presented evidence showing that the
letter actually confused a significant percentage of consumers. 3 After briefly introducing the reader to the
FDCPA and section 1692g, this article analyzes the potential conflict between the pre-Johnson and Johnson lines of
cases, proposes a means for reconciling the two lines, and
discusses the future of section 1692g litigation in the
Seventh Circuit in light of the potential conflict.
224
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II. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and
Section 1692g's Validation Requirement
In 1977, Congress passed the FDCPA as an amendto
ment the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act.' The
FDCPA's purposes are to "eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to
promote consistent State action to protect consumers
against debt collection abuses. " s To accomplish these
goals, the FDCPA imposes a number of restrictions on
7
how debt collectors 6 go about trying to collect debts.
In addition to restricting debt collector behavior,
the Act arms consumers with certain rights. Perhaps the
most important is the consumer's right under section
1692g to require the debt collector to provide proof that
the debt is valid by sending the debt collector a written
dispute of the debt within 30 days after receipt of the
8
debt collector's notice of the consumer's right to do so.
This right, commonly known as the "validation requirement," enables consumers to stop debt collectors from
continuing to hound them for invalid debts.9 Once a
consumer disputes the debt, the debt collector must
refrain from making any additional attempt to collect
until after it gives the consumer proof of the debt's valid0
ity.'
To ensure that consumers are made aware of this
right, the FDCPA requires each debt collector to give the
consumer a notice stating that the consumer has 30 days
to dispute the validity of the debt or any part of it. The
notice must be in writing and sent within 5 days after the
debt collector's initial communication with the consumer.1 Furthermore, the notice must state that if the
consumer disputes the debt, the debt collector will give
the consumer proof that the debt is valid.2 By its terms,
section 1692g merely requires the debt collector to give
the notice and no more. 3 However, most if not all courts
Volume 13, Number 3 2001
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hold that a debt collector does not discharge its obliga14
tion to give the notice unless it effectively conveys it.
This requirement is typically couched in the negative, i.e.,
the debt collector must refrain from presenting the notice
in a manner, or in connection with other information, that
could confuse the consumer about their rights. 5 Cases
involving claims that a debt collector has ineffectively
conveyed the section 16 9 2g notice basically fall into three
categories. The first is where the debt collector fails to
give the notice (or part of it), or inaccurately states the
notice. 6 The second is where the debt collector presents
the notice in a manner that makes it inconspicuous or
difficult to read. An example of this type of case is where
the debt collector prints the notice in small or faded type,
or places the notice on the back of the collection letter
7
with no reference to it on the front of the letter.'
The third, and perhaps the most often litigated,
method in which debt collectors ineffectively convey the
notice is by including other language with the notice or
in other communications made during the 30-day validation period that apparently, if not actually, conflicts with
the terms of the notice. A classic example of this type of
violation is a demand that the consumer pay the debt
within some time period that is shorter than the validation period itself, e.g., 10 days, in conjunction telling the
consumer that they have 30 days to request validation of
the debt. The Seventh Circuit has held that consumers
would be confused by this mixed-message:
We think that telling a debtor he has 30 days
to dispute the debt and following that with a
statement that '[i]f the above does not apply'
you have ten days to pay up or real trouble
will start is entirely inconsistent, and a failure to comply, with the FDCPA. We think the
unsophisticated consumer would be scratching his head upon receipt of such a letter. He
wouldn't have a clue as to what he was sup226
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posed to do before real trouble begins. A debt
validation notice, to be valid, must be effective, and it cannot be cleverly couched in such
a way as to eviscerate its message. To protect
the uninformed, the naive, and the trusting
- the sort of people who easily fit under the
umbrella of the 'unsophisticated consumer'
- the notice cannot be as misleading and
tricky as the one used here.. .18
As this passage suggests, in determining whether
a communication violates section 1692g the communication must be construed through the eyes of the "unsophisticated consumer." 19 The ultimate question then in all
section 1692g cases where the plaintiff claims the debt
collector has included other language in its communications that apparently conflicts with the statement of the
consumer's validation rights is whether the other language would "confuse" the hypothetical "unsophisticated consumer" about his or her rights. °

III. The Potential Conflict Between Johnson
and Pre-Johnson Cases, Its Genesis, and How to
Resolve It
A. The Conflict
Before Johnson, the Seventh Circuit decided
whether a collection letter confused the unsophisticated
consumer about his or her validation rights by examining
the text of the collection letter alone. 21 However, in
Johnson, and later in Walker v. National Recovery, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff could not prove
their section 1692g confusion claims solely from the text
of the collection letter.22 Under Johnson and Walker, plaintiffs may now have to produce evidence, in the form of a
consumer survey or otherwise, 23 that the letter actually
24
confuses unsophisticated consumers about their rights.
Volume 13, Number 3 2001
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It thus appears that Johnson and Walker's "evidence
required" rule conflicts with the Seventh Circuit's prior
decisions on what is needed to show that a collection
letter confuses in violation of section 1692g of the
25
FDCPA.
B.

The Origin of the Conflict

To fully understand the apparent conflict between
the pre-Johnson and Johnson lines of cases, it is helpful to
look at the development of the "no evidence required"
rule the Seventh Circuit applied in pre-Johnson cases. The
Court laid the foundation for that rule in one of its first
FDCPA decisions, Gammon v. G.C. Services, L.P.2 6 The
Gammon court faced the question of whether the
plaintiff's allegation that the collection letter at issue was
deceptive in violation of section 1692e(1) stated a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 27 The
majority held that the plaintiff did state a claim based on
the Court's analysis of the text of the collection letter.
Judge Easterbrook wrote a concurring opinion stating
that the plaintiff should have to produce evidence of
deception on remand to win. 28 These two features demonstrate the Court's apparent belief (at the time) that evidence of actual consumer confusion was not needed to
prove a violation of the Act because, if the Court meant to
chart a course similar to Johnson: (1) it would have held
that Gammon stated a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
without analyzing the text of the letter;2 9 and (2) Judge
Easterbrook's concurrence would have been the majority
opinion.
Later, the Seventh Circuit made the "no evidence
required" rule explicit in Avila v. Rubin. The collection
letter in Avila demanded payment within 10 days. 30 The
defendants argued, based on Judge Easterbrook's concurring opinion in Gammon, that to win, the plaintiff had to
put forth evidence that this language confused a significant percentage of consumers.3 1 The Court rejected that
228
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argument holding that the collection letters at issue could
be found to violate section 1692g "without reference to
evidence of actual consumer confusion. 32 In doing so,
the Court characterized Judge Easterbrook's statements
in Gammon as a "suggestion. 33 However, the Court left
the door open for requiring evidence of confusion in
some section 1692g cases by implying that such evidence
may be required for cases that do not involve a demand
for payment within a time period shorter than the validation period. 34
Two section 1692g cases later, in Bartlett v. Heibl
(the next section 1692g case after Avila was Chauncey v.
JDR Recovery Corp.35), the Court seemed to close that door
to some extent, if not entirely, by holding that "the issue
of confusion (or, more precisely, of 'confusingness') is for
the district judge to decide." Furthermore, the Court
implied that the determination of whether the letter
violated section 1692g should be made by the judge after
looking at the text of the letter.37 The letter in Bartlett
demanded payment in one week in addition to giving the
30-day validation notice. 3 The Court held, as it did in
Avila (and Chauncey), that this language violated section
169 2 g based on an analysis of the text of the letter
alone.39
In reaching that conclusion, the Court did not
characterize the claim as one involving a "contradiction"
4
of the validation notice as it did in Avila (and Chauncey). 0
Instead, the Court found "confusion whatever form it
takes" is the touchstone for finding a violation, and that
the various section 1692g claims courts had previously
decided were based on a finding, explicit or implicit, that
the letters at issue confused the unsophisticated consumer about their validation rights. Likewise, the Court
held that cases previously decided under section 1692g
fall into three categories: "actual contradiction" (express
denial of part or all of the consumer's validation rights);
"overshadowing" (faded print, small type, etc.); and
"apparent contradiction" (demand for action during the
Volume 13, Number 3 2001
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validation period with no explanation as to how the
demand and validation language fit together). 41 The
Court concluded that the type of violation at issue, as
well as those at issue in Avila, Chauncey and similar cases,
fell into the latter category, i.e., it involved an "apparent
contradiction. 42 Thus, after Bartlett it appeared to be the
rule in the Seventh Circuit that courts could decide all
cases involving an actual or "apparent contradiction" of
the validation notice based on the text of the letter alone.
C. Reconciling the Johnson and Pre-Johnson Lines of
Cases
No reconciliation of the Johnson and pre-Johnson
lines of cases is possible unless one interprets Bartlett's
holding that "the issue of confusion is for the district
judge to decide ' 43 to mean something other than "confusion is to be determined based on the text of the letter
alone, without the need for evidence." 4 To do this,
Bartlett's reference to the province of the district judge
must be interpreted to mean "the fact finder in Bartlett"
(which is plausible because that case was tried to the
bench) "after considering evidence, if necessary."45
Combining this interpretation of Bartlett and the
Court's characterization of the type of section 1692g
claim at issue in that case (and in Avila and Chauncey, i.e.,
an "apparent contradiction") with Avila's unequivocal
rejection of the need for evidence in similar circumstances, the pre-Johnsonand Johnson lines of cases may be
reconciled by concluding that Johnson and its progeny
require evidence in some section 1692g cases, but not
all.4 Specifically, no evidence is required in section 1692g
cases that involve an "actual contradiction" of the
consumer's validation rights (as defined in Bartlett), or in
one subset of the "apparent contradiction" type of cases,
i.e., those involving a demand for payment within a time
period that is shorter than the validation period, as in
Avila, Chauncey and Bartlett.Conversely, evidence may be
230
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required in "overshadowing" cases (as defined by
Bartlett)47 and in another subset of the "apparent contradiction" type of cases, i.e., cases like Johnson that arose
from language that creates a false sense of "urgency" that
could cause the consumer to forgo their validation
rights. 8
There is support for this proposed reconciliation
in the Johnson line itself. Both Johnson and Walker couch
their "evidence required" holdings in a way that suggests
that evidence is not necessary in all section 169 2g confusion cases.49 Moreover, both cases held that evidence was
needed in those cases because of the text of the particular
collection letters at issue, implying that the Court might
have reached a different result if presented with different
letters.50
The reconciliation is also supported by the fact
that the Seventh Circuit has never acknowledged that it
made any departure from Bartlett or its predecessors. To
the contrary, the Seventh Circuit relies on Bartlett (somewhat) to support its rationale for the Johnson line."
But the proposed reconciliation is not fool-proof.
All of the section 1692g decisions in both lines of cases
involved an "apparent contradiction" section 169 2g
claim, and the proposed reconciliation depends on the
Court recognizing that there are at least two distinct
subsets of that type of claim.52 The Seventh Circuit has
indicated that it might view such a distinction as
irrelevant.5 3 Furthermore, one would think that after
painstakingly defining the various types of section 1692g
confusion claims in Bartlett, the Court would have made
any further refinement of those categories explicit if that
was what the Court intended to do. The bottom line then
is that if courts that confront this issue in the future
refuse to accept the division of the "apparent contradiction" category of cases proposed here (or some variation
of it), then an irreconcilable conflict remains - the Seventh Circuit decided pre-Johnson "apparent contradiction" cases by examining the text of the letters at issue
Volume 13, Number 3 2001
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alone, while Johnson and Walker required evidence of
confusion for the same category of section 169 2g claim.

IV. The Consequences for Future Section 1692g
Cases in the Seventh Circuit if There Is a
Conflict
A. A Conflict Does Not Invalidate Either the PreJohnson or Johnson Line
Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e) requires, before publication of any opinion that will "overrule a prior decision"
of the Seventh Circuit or create a conflict "between or
among circuits," that the panel submit the opinion to
other active members of the Court for a vote on whether
to hear the case en banc.54 In addition to creating a potential conflict within the Seventh Circuit, Johnson also
conflicts with other circuits:
We note that the Seventh Circuit is the only
court of appeals to have held that whether
an unsophisticated consumer would be
confused by allegedly contradictory or
overshadowing language is a question of
fact which precludes dismissal under
Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6) [citations omitted]. The
majority of courts to have considered this
question have, however, held that this
55
determination involves a question of law.
Yet Johnson was never circulated for potential en banc
review under Circuit Rule 40(e).56 The closest the Court
came to doing so was to circulate the Walker opinion for
potential en banc review because it raised "an issue of
general importance about the proper application of Rule
12(b)(6)."57 However, that is not the same issue as the
question of whether FDCPA plaintiffs must present
Loyola Consumer Law Review
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evidence of confusion to win a section 1692g claim."
If Johnson creates a conflict, that raises the question
of whether the Court's failure to follow Circuit Rule 40(e)
invalidates the Johnson line or, if not, whether the Johnson
line overrules the pre-Johnson line. There are several
reasons to believe a conflict does not affect the validity of
either line. As for the continuing validity of the Johnson
line, no Seventh Circuit case holds that a failure to follow
Circuit Rule 40(e) renders any case invalid. Likewise, for
the pre-Johnson line, none of the Johnson line of cases state
that they overrule Avila, Chauncey, or Bartlett to any
degree, 59 and the Johnson court's failure to follow Circuit
Rule 40(e) implies that the Court did not intend for
Johnson to do so. Support for the continuing validity of
both lines lies in case law implying that when a conflict
occurs within the Seventh Circuit, decisions on both sides
of the conflict remain valid until a particular panel of the
Court undertakes to expressly resolve the conflict.'
B. The Conflict Gives Litigants a Means for Avoiding
the "Evidence Required" Rule in "Apparent Contradiction" Cases
Because of the continuing validity of the "no
evidence required" cases, future litigants are entitled to
argue that either line of cases may be applied to determine whether a given collection letter that contains an
"apparent contradiction" of the consumer's validation
rights violates section 1692g of the FDCPA. Judge
Eschbach's concurring opinion in Johnson explains why
plaintiffs would want to avoid Johnson and its progeny,
stating that to require a survey or other empirical evidence of confusion "will gut the purposes of the FDCPA"
because such evidence "can be very costly," and thereby
make "the cost of filing suit under the FDCPA
prohibitive." 1 Defendants will no doubt find the "cost"
aspect of requiring evidence of confusion just as unappealing. 62
Volume 13, Number 3 2001
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Since both lines of cases are valid, plaintiffs and
defendants who do not like the prospect of having to
incur the expense of generating a consumer survey or
other empirical evidence have a good faith basis for
arguing why they do not have to do so.63 If the plaintiff's
facts are similar to those at issue in Johnson and Walker,
either party may argue that there is a conflict of law and,
therefore, that the trial court may (because the preJohnson line is still good law), and should (for the reasons
described in Judge Eschbach's concurrence in Johnson),
follow the pre-johnson line to decide whether the letter at
issue violates section 169 2g of the FDCPA. 64 And, if the
plaintiff's facts are similar to those at issue in Avila,
Chauncey and Bartlett, either party may argue that the
proposed reconciliation compels the conclusion that no
evidence is required, that there are two conflicting lines
of authority and that the court should follow the preJohnson line, or both (in the alternative).
Of course, either party may appeal an adverse
decision on this issue. And, when confronted with the
foregoing analysis, the Seventh Circuit might clarify the
Johnson line to exempt cases like Avila, Chauncey and
Bartlett from its "evidence required" rule, reconsider the
Johnson line entirely, or at least sanctify some way of
harmonizing all of the Court's section 1692g decisions.

V. Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Johnson v. Revenue
Mgmt. Corp. that evidence may be required to prove a
claim under section 169 2 g of the FDCPA potentially
conflicts with the Court's pre-Johnson decisions on what
is needed to show that a collection letter confuses the
unsophisticated consumer. The Johnson and pre-Johnson
lines of cases are reconcilable so long as courts find that
evidence is not required to prove an "apparent contradiction" claim arising from a demand for payment within a
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time period that is shorter than the validation period
provided by section 169 2 g.
The Seventh Circuit should undertake to resolve
this potential conflict at the first opportunity. Although
the potential conflict does not affect the validity of the
Johnson or pre-Johnson line of cases, it creates uncertainty
for all litigants in assessing the merit of a claim or defense under section 1692g, and in assessing the costs of
prosecuting and defending the case.
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He received his J.D. with Distinction from the University of Iowa
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2. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a - 1692o
(2000).
3. Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.
1999).
4. Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998).
5. Powell v. Computer Credit, Inc., 975 F.Supp. 1034, 1038 (S.D. Ohio
1997), aff'd, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 26797 (6th Cir. 1998). The findings
underpinning the Act included that, "Abusive debt collection
practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to
marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual
privacy.... Existing laws and procedures for redressing these
injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.... Means other than
misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are
available for the effective collection of debts. Id.
6. A "debt collector" covered by the Act is not limited to "collection
agencies," as that term is commonly understood. It includes "any
person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the
mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection
of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly
or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another [and] ... any creditor who, in the process of collecting his

own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate
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that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts."
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). So, for example, this definition includes independent attorneys that collect debts by litigation or otherwise. See
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995). There are, however, a
number of exceptions to the general definition. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
7. For example, debt collectors "may not engage in any conduct the
natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any
person in connection with the collection of a debt." 15 U.S.C. §
1692d. Debt collectors may not "use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. And, debt collectors may not "use unfair or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt." 15
U.S.C. § 1692 f. Each of these provisions provides a non-exclusive list
of practices that violate their terms. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d-1692f.
The Act contains other restrictions as well. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b,
1692c, 1692i and 1692j. For a comprehensive treatment on the
FDCPA, I strongly recommend ROBERT J. HOBBS, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
(4th ed. 2000).
8. Ost v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 493 F.Supp. 701, 702 (D.C.N.D. 1980).
"The validation of debts provision is a significant feature of this
legislation, the intent being to 'eliminate the recurring problem of
debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect
debts which the consumer has already paid.'" Id. (quoting S. REP. No.
95-382 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699). Other rights
conferred by the FDCPA include the right to require the debt collector to stop contacting the consumer about the debt, the right to
require the debt collector to apply partial payments on multiple
debts to the debt or debts that the consumer directs, and, perhaps
most importantly, the right to file a lawsuit in federal court to
remedy any violation of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 1692h, and
1692k.
9. Ost, 493 F.Supp. at 702. A debt may be invalid for many reasons.
The debt may be totally invalid because the consumer already paid it
or never owed it, e.g., it is owed by another, or was incurred through
the fraudulent use of the consumer's identity. The debt may also be
partially invalid because it includes interest that was never incurred,
illegal charges or fees, or simply because of creditor error in communicating the amount of the debt to be collected.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(g)(a).
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12. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) and (4). The notice must also state the
amount of the debt, the name of the creditor to whom the debt is
owed, and that the debt collector will give the consumer the name of
the original creditor, if different from the current creditor, upon the
consumer's written request. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), (2) and (5).
13. The text of § 1692g states:
(a) Notice of debt; contents. Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any
debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is
contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the
debt, send the consumer a written notice containing(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days
after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the
debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to
be valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt,
or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector
will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the
debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request
within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will
provide the consumer with the name and address of the
original creditor, if different from the current creditor.
(b) Disputed debts. If the consumer notifies the debt collector in
writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) that
the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer
requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt
collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion
thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a
copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor,
and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of
the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.
(c) Admission of liability. The failure of a consumer to dispute the
validity of a debt under this section may not be construed by any
court as an admission of liability by the consumer.
14. Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 226 (7th Cir. 1996); Russell v. Equifax
A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2th Cir. 1996); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F2d
107, 111 (3th Cir. 1991); Miller v. Payco-General American Credits,
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Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991); Swanson v. Southern Oregon
Credit Service, Inc. 869 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1988).
15. See cases cited supra note 14.
16. See, e.g., Romine v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 155 F.3d 1142,
1143 (9th Cir. 1998) (alleging that one of the two defendant debt
collectors failed to give the notice required by § 1692g within five
days of its initial communication with the consumer).
17. See, e.g., Payco-GeneralAm. Credits, 943 F2d at 483. The goal
behind these tactics naturally enough is to distract the consumer
from the validation language, thus avoiding the exercise of the
consumer's validation rights.
18. Avila, 84 F.3d at 226. See also, Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501
(7th Cir. 1997) (initial letter demanding payment in 7 days creates an
apparent contradiction violating § 1692g as a matter of law because
"[tihe net effect of the juxtaposition of the one-week and thirty-day
crucial periods is to turn the required disclosure into legal gibberish.").
19. Gammon v. G.C. Serv. L.P., 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994). For a
more in-depth description of this standard, see discussion infra note
25. Most other circuits apply the "least sophisticated consumer"
standard. See Wilson v. Quadramed, 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000);
Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1998); United
States v. National Financial Serv., Inc., 98 F.3d 131,136 (4th Cir. 1996);
Smith v. Computer Credit, Inc., 167 F.3d 1052, 1054 (6th Cir. 1999);
and Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1997). There
appears to be no practical difference between the two standards.
Avila, 84 F.3d at 227.
20. Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d at 500.
21. Id. at 500-01; Chauncey v. JDR Recovery Corp., 118 F.3d 516, 519
(7th Cir. 1997); Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d at 226. ("We think the validation notice was clearly overshadowed by the language that followed
on its heels."). In this quote, "overshadow" was being used in a
generic sense to mean "rendered ineffective." As explained in
Bartlett, courts have used a variety of terms, e.g., "contradict,"
"overshadow," etc., to articulate the finding that a collection letter
renders the validation notice ineffective. Bartlett, 128 E3d at 500.
Bartlett sought to eliminate these variations in terminology (at least
in the Seventh Circuit) by holding that the appropriate way to
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describe a letter that renders the notice ineffective is to state simply
that the letter "confuses." Id.
22. Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1999) ("If
all the plaintiffs have to go on is the language of these letters, they
must lose in the end."); Walker, 200 F.3d at 504. The Seventh Circuit
later expanded the reach of its holdings in Johnson and Walker to
claims under other provisions of the FDCPA. See Pettit v. Retrieval
Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 2000)
(plaintiff cannot prove collection letter was deceptive in violation of
§ 1692e of the FDCPA based on the plaintiff's perceptions alone).
23. It is not enough to present evidence in the form of the plaintiff's
particular impressions from reading the letter - the evidence must
show that a "significant fraction of the population would be similarly misled." Pettit, 211 F.3d at 1060.
24. Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1060 ("it will be necessary to show that the
additional language of the letters unacceptably increases the level of
confusion"); Walker, 200 F.3d at 503 ("When the plaintiff decides...
to forego factual development, then the case may come to an end by
judgment on the pleadings under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c).").
25. Johnson's "evidence required" rule may also be inconsistent with
the "unsophisticated consumer" standard. The standard has two
aspects: (1) the letter is examined through the eyes of people of
"below average sophistication or intelligence" to determine whether
it is confusing but (2) this examination is tempered by "an objective
element of reasonableness" to guard against "unrealistic or peculiar
interpretations of collection letters." Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1257. Requiring evidence of actual consumer confusion is consistent with the first
aspect of the test because that aspect simply establishes the subset of
people whose perceptions must be used to generate the evidence.
However, it is not clear how the "reasonableness" aspect of
the test is applied under the "evidence required" rule. If evidence is
required to show that unsophisticated consumers are confused, and
such evidence is produced, can the district court simply toss the
evidence out because the court finds the result unreasonable? It is
doubtful the Seventh Circuit would permit the district court to do so.
See, e.g., Walker v. Nat'l Recovery, Inc., 200 F.3d 500, 501 (7th Cir.
1999) ("District judges are not good proxies for the 'unsophisticated
consumers' whose interests the statute protects.").
Nor can the "reasonableness" aspect of the test simply act as
the reason for producing evidence in the first place (i.e., the "reasonableness" of a particular interpretation of a letter turning on whether
the evidence shows that interpretation to be correct). That analysis
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would eliminate the "reasonableness" aspect as an analytical component of the standard - why expressly state that the plaintiff's proffered interpretation of a letter must be "reasonable" if that determination is only going made after the fact, i.e., after the evidence shows
it is reasonable?
Perhaps the way to reconcile the "reasonableness" aspect of
the "unsophisticated consumer" standard with the "evidence
required" rule is to find that it defines the quality of the evidence the
plaintiff must produce. The Seventh Circuit has held that not just any
evidence will suffice to prove that a given letter is confusing. Pettit v.
Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1060-1062
(7th Cir. 2000) ("The self-serving opinion of the plaintiff.., does not
create a genuine issue for trial.... under the FDCPA, confusion is
not in the eyes of the beholder."). To show that the plaintiff's interpretation of a letter is that of the "reasonable" unsophisticated
consumer, the evidence must show that "a significant fraction of the
population would be similarly misled"; whether it be in the form of
testimony by an "expert or objective observer," a "survey," or other
means. Id. at 1060, 1062. However, this analysis is not flawless
because, in Gammon, the Seventh Circuit twice concluded that the
plaintiff's proffered interpretation of the letter at issue was "reasonable" even though the plaintiff had not yet produced any evidence
that the unsophisticated consumer would interpret the letter the
same way the plaintiff advocated. Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1257 ("an
unsophisticated consumer reasonably could interpret this statement
[to mean what the plaintiff alleges]"). The "reasonableness" aspect of
the test cannot define the quality of evidence needed if a court can
determine that a particular interpretation is reasonable before seeing
such evidence.
26. Gammon v. G.C. Services Ltd. L.P., 27 E3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir.
1994).
27. Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1257-58. Section 1692e(1) prohibits a debt
collector from making "[tihe false representation or implication that
the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the
United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform,
or facsimile thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1).
28. Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1258-59.
29. Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1059 ("A contention that a debt-collection
notice is confusing is a recognized legal claim; no more is needed to
survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).").
30. Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1996).
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31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The Avila court distinguished "literally true" statements "that
are potentially deceptive," e.g., those in Gammon, with literally false
statements. Avila, 84 F.3d at 227. The Court then went on to find that
the "contradiction" between a demand for payment in 10 days and
the 30 day validation period is more akin to a literally false statement
- accordingly, no evidence of confusion is needed. Id. The Bartlett
case recharacterized the nature of this claim. See supra note 21.
35. Chauncey v. JDR Recovery Corp., 118 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 1997).
There, the Court applied the "no evidence required" rule without
elaboration to hold that the debt collector's letter "contradicted" the
validation notice because the letter demanded that the consumer pay
before the end of the validation period. Id. at 518.
36. Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500-501 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis
added). The Court also stated that "the question of whether a
dunning letter violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does
not require evidence that the recipient was confused." Id. at 501. But
this statement is not necessarily inconsistent with the Johnson line. If
the term "recipient" just means "the plaintiff," then the apparent
conflict is reconciled by the Court's subsequent holding in Pettit v.
Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau that the plaintiff's particular
impressions from the letter at issue are insufficient to prove confusion. Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057,
1062 (7th Cir. 2000).
37. Barlett, 128 F.3d at 501.
38. Id. at 499.
39. Id. at 501 ("The cases, however, leave no room for doubt that the
letter to Bartlett was confusing.").
40. For an explanation of what is meant by the term "contradiction"
see supra note 21.
41. Barlett, 128 F.3d at 500. The Bartlettcourt stated: "The cases that
find the statute violated generally involve neither logical inconsistencies (that is, denials of the consumer rights that the dunning letter
is required to disclose) nor the kind of literal 'overshadowing'
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involved in a fine-print, or faint-print or confusing-typeface case. In
the typical case, the letter both demands payment within thirty days
and explains the consumer's right to demand verification within
thirty days. These rights are not inconsistent, but by failing to
explain how they fit together the letter confuses." Id.
42. Id. at 500.
43. Id. at 501.
44. Id.
45. However, coupled with the statement about the irrelevance of the
recipient's impressions discussed supra note 23, this interpretation
creates what seems like too many careless word choices on Judge
Posner's part, particularly coupled with his opinion in White v.
Goodman, 200 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2000). The White case involved,
inter alia, a claim that a letter was deceptive in violation of § 1692e.
Id. at 1020. ("The plaintiffs have another claim, this one under the
general provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act forbidding deceptive debt collection practices."). Although White was
argued and decided well after Johnson, the Court concluded that the
alleged deception was "fantastic conjecture" without any discussion
of the need for, or failure to produce, evidence on that question. Id.
The Court's opinion does not even mention Johnson. Id.
46. At least two cases suggest that this reconciliation is tenable. Smith
v. Short Term Loans, L.L.C., et al., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1554 at *2930 (N.D. 111. Feb. 9, 2001) ("The defendants argue that several Seventh Circuit cases... [hold] that a plaintiff must present a survey or
other extrinsic evidence showing confusion.. . The court, however,
believes that defendants are reading too much into [those] decisions."); Nance v. Friedman, 2000 WL 1230462, *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28,
2000) ("Such evidence may not be required in all FDCPA cases; in
Avila, evidence of consumer confusion was unnecessary.").
47. The Seventh Circuit has never addressed this type of § 1692g
case.
48. Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir.
1999) (demand for "prompt payment" and "[clall our office immediately"); Walker v. National Recovery, Inc., 200 F.3d 500, 502 (7th Cir.
1999) ("Your past-due account... has been placed with our company
for immediate collection"); Marshall-Mosby v. Corp. Receivables,
Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The above account has been
placed with this office for immediate collection.").
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49. Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1060 ("To learn how an unsophisticated
reader reacts to a letter, the judge may need to receive evidence.");
Walker, 200 F.3d at 504. See also, Walker v. National Recovery, Inc., 42
F. Supp. 2d 773, 783 (N.D. 111. 1999) (expressly noting Johnson's
holding that evidence "may" - not must - be required), rev'd, 200
F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 1999). In reversing, Seventh Circuit did not directly
address this point.
50. Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1060 ("If all the plaintiffs have to go on is the
language of these letters.. .") (emphasis added); Walker, 200 F.3d at
504 (same holding, quoting Johnson and further stating, "That is
equally true of the letters in this case.").
51. See, e.g., Walker, 200 E3d at 503 ("Whether a given message is
confusing is, we held in Gammon, Bartlett, and Johnson, a question of
fact."). However, the Court's statement is only partially correct
because, although the Seventh Circuit did hold that confusion is a
question of fact in Bartlett and Johnson, the Gammon majority opinion
contains no such holding - only Judge Easterbrook's concurring
opinion does. Gammon v. G.C. Serv. L.P., 27 F.3d 1254, 1259 (7th Cir.
1994) ("Like my colleagues, I think that the trier of fact must inquire
whether a misleading implication arises from an objectively reasonable reading of the communication."). The basis for Judge
Easterbrook's statement that his colleagues "share" his opinion is not
clear.
52. Alternatively, a court could hold that Johnson created a fourth
type of § 1692g claim. But it is doubtful that that is what Johnson was
trying to do because Bartlett did not create such a category in its list
of the types of § 1692g cases even though there are cases involving
facts similar to those at issue in Johnson and Walker that pre-date
Bartlett. See Tychewicz v. Dobberstein, No. 96-C-195-S, slip. op. at 3
(W.D. Wis. Aug 28, 1996); Powell v. Computer Credit, Inc., 975
F.Supp. 1034, 1038 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Gammon v. Belzer, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5170 at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
53. Walker, 200 F.3d at 501 ("When the Bartlett language is not employed, however, a debt collector whose dunning letter suggests
urgency must meet on the merits a contention that the letter would
confuse an unsophisticated reader.").
54. 7th Cir. R. 40(e); Walker v. J.T. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 634 (7th Cir.
2000) ("That is the purpose of Seventh Circuit Local Rule 40(e),
under which the court does not create a new conflict without consulting all active judges.").
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55. Wilson v. Quadramed, 225 F.3d 350, 353, n.2 (3d Cir. 2000). The
Third Circuit overstates its case a bit because the Ninth Circuit has
held that the question of whether a debt collector violated § 1692g is
a question of fact. Baker v. G.C. Services Corp. 677 F.2d 775, 778 (9th
Cir. 1982). A later Ninth Circuit case held that "the caselaw makes
clear that the question whether language in a collection letter overshadows or contradicts the validation notice so as to confuse a least
sophisticated debtor is a question of law," and proceeded to decide
that question as a matter of law, without explaining how its decision
squared with Baker. Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir.
1997).
56. Opinions circulated for en banc consideration under the rule must
contain a footnote showing that the rule was complied with. 7th Cir.
R. 40(e). The Johnson opinion does not contain such a footnote.
57. Walker, 200 F.3d at 504. The initial Marshall-Mosby opinion affirmed a dismissal of a § 1692g confusion claim under FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), thus conflicting with Johnson and Walker. The panel reheard
the case without further briefing and subsequently issued an opinion
consistent with Johnson and Walker therefore vacating the prior one.
See Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 33548 (Dec. 21, 1999).
58. Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir.
1999) (Eschbach, J., concurring) ("I write separately because of two
concerns I have with the conclusions of my colleagues..."). The first
concern was the panel's construction of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and
the second was the panel's "emphasis on survey evidence" in
FDCPA cases, indicating that these are two distinct issues. Id. at
1061.
59. Walker v. National Recovery, Inc., 42 F.Supp.2d 773, 783 (N.D. Ill.
1999), rev'd, 200 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 1999). The reversal of Walker may
call this reason into question somewhat, but it is equally indicative of
the Seventh Circuit's intention that there should be no reversal since
it remained silent on this point after considering the district court's
opinion.
60. See United States v. Buford, 201 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2000)
("Because this conclusion resolves a conflict among panels of this
court, it was circulated to all active judges under Circuit Rule
40(e)."); United States v. Windom, 19 F.3d 1190, 1195 (7th Cir. 1994)
("Several panels of this court have pointed out the conflict between
these two standards, but none have resolved it.").
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61. Johnson, 169 F.3d at 1063 (Eschbach, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
62. This assumes that plaintiffs can find an affordable way to obtain
evidence of confusion. If not, defendants will rarely, if ever, have to
defend these types of cases in the future.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) prohibits one from advancing a legal
argument that is not "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
or the establishment of new law."
64. Some district courts continue to decide § 1692g cases without
evidence of confusion, but do so without recognizing any conflict in
Seventh Circuit authority. See Shepherd v. United Compucred
Collections, Inc., No. 99 C 433, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2000)
("Overshadowing is a question for judges." - based on the text of the
letters alone, the Court found a violation of § 1692g and entered
summary judgment for plaintiff and the class.).
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